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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the tragedies at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and 
Northern Illinois University,1 FDA black box warnings on antidepres-
sants for young adults,2 and the Church of Scientology’s public stance 
against psychotropic medications,3 children’s mental health is of great 
and growing concern to parents, schools, and society at large.4  Although 
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 1. On the morning of April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School, Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold, walked onto campus, shot to death twelve fellow students and a teacher, and then 
killed themselves.  Tina Kelley, In an Era of School Shootings, A New Drill, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/nyregion/25drills.html.  On April 16, 2007, a student at 
the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Seung-Hui Cho, opened fire in a dormitory 
and classroom building on campus, killing thirty-two people before committing suicide.  Kelley, 
supra; Elizabeth Stone, The Expanding Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/education/edlife/mental.html.   On February 14, 2008, Stephen 
Kazmierczak, a former student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire on students in a lecture 
hall, fatally shooting five students and injuring eighteen more, before turning the gun on himself.  
Kelley, supra; Stone, supra.  All four individuals suffered from mental health problems, including 
depression and anger management issues, antisocial personality disorder, extreme social anxiety and 
isolative tendencies, and obsessive compulsive disorder, respectively. 
 2. The Food and Drug Administration ordered drug manufacturers to add warnings (in a black 
box displayed on the prescribing information) to antidepressant medications, which inform users that 
the drug may increase the risk of suicidal thinking or behavior in some young adults.  Benedict Ca-
rey, F.D.A. Expands Suicide Warning on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/health/03depress.html. 
 3. Joel Sappell & Robert W. Welkos, Suits, Protests Fuel a Campaign Against Psychiatry, L.A. 
TIMES, June 29, 1990, http://www.latimes.com/la-scientology062990a,0,3292532.story (explaining 
Scientologists’ eager campaign against the “problem of psychiatric drugging”). 
 4. Stone, supra note 1. 
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research is improving, relatively little is known about the most effective 
strategies for the prevention, detection, diagnosis, and treatment of child-
hood mental disorders.5 
Because factors such as lack of medical knowledge, cultural beliefs, 
privacy concerns, and stigmatization shape attitudes toward children’s 
mental health, this social issue lacks consensus on not only basic defini-
tions but also effective strategies.6  As a result, states have begun to take 
radically different approaches to children’s mental health legislation.7  In 
addition to the factors that influence peoples’ attitudes toward children’s 
mental health, several core issues complicate the debate on children’s 
mental health, including the role of parenting and family values,8 the de-
cision to treat children with pharmaceuticals,9 and the ethics of pediatric 
clinical research.10  While these factors and issues guide parents, schools, 
and legislators in acknowledging childhood mental illness,11 they should 
not take precedence over the best interests of the mentally ill child.  If the 
intention of all those involved is to protect the best interests of the men-
tally ill child, the issues that most need to be addressed in this dialogue 
are how to prevent and detect children’s mental illness.12 
To improve the prevention and detection of childhood mental ill-
ness, it is first necessary to consider the systems at work.  That is, who is 
in the best position to prevent the onset of a child’s mental disorder?13  
Who is in the best position to detect if a child suffers from mental ill-
ness?14  Few would argue that the two social groups most intimately in-
volved in a child’s life, and therefore in the best positions to prevent and 
recognize a child’s mental health issue, are parents and family members 
                                                            
 5. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 193 (1999), available 
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html [hereinafter REPORT OF SURGEON 
GENERAL]. The Surgeon General’s office created this report on mental health to provide a review of 
scientific advances in the study of mental health and of mental illnesses for the public.  Id. at 3. 
 6. Jeffrey Kluger et al., Medicating Young Minds, TIME, Nov. 3, 2003, at 48, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006034,00.html. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: TREATMENT OF 
CHILDREN WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 2 (2000), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ 
health/publications/treatment-of-children-with-mentaldisorders/complete.pdf [hereinafter 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS]. 
 10. Kathleen C. Glass & Ariella Binik, Rethinking Risk in Pediatric Research, 36 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 567, 573 (2008). 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools and Public Health, 121 
PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 294, 296 (May-June 2006). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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and teachers and schools.15  But if both the family unit and the education 
system are gatekeepers of a child’s mental health, which system should 
be responsible for standing guard?  And what is the best way for that sys-
tem to implement comprehensive prevention and detection measures?  
These are the central issues of this Comment.  Consensus is polarized on 
the issue of the proper respective roles of parents and the public educa-
tion system in not only offering preventative measures but also detecting 
childhood mental illness.16 
This Comment explores three states’ approaches to mental health 
screenings for earlier identification of impaired mental health functioning 
in educational settings.  The State of Washington has yet to pass any leg-
islation aimed at instituting a mental health schema within its public 
schools.  This Comment argues that the Washington legislature should 
enact children’s mental health legislation that reflects an integration of 
the three state positions.17  Specifically, Washington should adopt a co-
operative and transparent mental health scheme for public schools that 
includes in-school screening, informed and active parental consent, edu-
cator training, and emotional health curriculum because it preserves pa-
rental rights while also protecting the well-being of mentally ill children. 
Part II of this Comment discusses both the current state of chil-
dren’s mental health and the concepts of prevention and detection.  It 
emphasizes the significance of educating teachers, implementing emo-
tional health curricula in public schools, and utilizing mental health 
screenings as early detection devices.  It also provides a summary of the 
current state of children’s mental health law as it relates to Washington’s 
public education system.  Part III describes the federal government’s atti-
tude toward children’s mental health and reviews federal statutes pertain-
ing to the distribution of school surveys in public schools.  Part IV ex-
plains the development of the constitutional right to parent and its appli-
cation to children’s mental health.  It also discusses the tension between 
parents and schools on privacy issues such as distributing screenings to 
students.  Part V presents children’s mental health legislation from three 
states: Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut.  This Part introduces not only the 
substance of the various legislative measures but also the radically dif-
ferent positions taken.  Part VI recommends that Washington adopt a 
cooperative and transparent system that includes in-school screening, 
informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emotional 
health curricula. 
                                                            
 15. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 136. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. The three states that will be discussed are Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut.  The scope of the 
legislation is described further in Part V. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Before describing the mental health legislation Washington ought 
to adopt, it is first necessary to define mental health and mental disorder 
and discuss how children are affected when they are labeled by such 
terms.  This Part also introduces the concepts of prevention and detection 
to emphasize the need for holistic legislation and mental health screen-
ings.  Finally, this Part concludes with a summary of Washington’s cur-
rent children’s mental health legislation. 
A.  The Mentally Ill Child 
According to the Surgeon General’s Report on Mental Health, men-
tal health is “a state of successful performance of mental functioning, 
resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with other peo-
ple, and the ability to adapt to change and cope with adversity.”18  Mental 
illness, on the other hand, “refers collectively to all of the diagnosable 
mental disorders”19 included in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of 
Mental Disorders IV.20  Mental disorders are “health conditions that are 
characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some 
combination thereof) associated with distress or impaired functioning.”21 
Mental health is perceived along a spectrum stretching from “suc-
cessful mental functioning” to “impaired functioning.”22  The mental 
health spectrum exists for both children and adults.23  In the relatively 
recent past, professionals believed that mental disorders such as anxiety 
disorders, depression, and bipolar disorder began in adulthood.24  Now, 
however, it is well-known that these disorders can begin in childhood.25  
It is estimated that ten percent of children and adolescents in the United 
States suffer from mental illness severe enough to cause some level of 
impairment.26  The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that 
fewer than one in five of those children receive treatment.27 
                                                            
 18. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 4. 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ADMINISTRATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994). 
 21. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 5. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 10, at 2.  The National Institute of Mental Health 
collaborated with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, and the 
National Institutes of Health to create this document for the public especially for parents concerned 
about doctors prescribing psychotropic medications to their children.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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This startling statistic can be explained by problems with detection.  
Because children develop and grow at a rapid pace, it is often difficult 
for professionals such as pediatricians, child and adolescent psychiatrists, 
therapists, and school personnel to diagnose childhood mental illness.28  
For example, some mental health problems are short-lived—such as situ-
ational anxiety or depression—and therefore require no treatment.29  
Others are persistent and serious—such as autism, bipolar disorder, and 
schizophrenia—and necessitate substantial professional treatment.30 
Because mental illness affects ten percent of children and adoles-
cents, it is important for states to take positive steps toward enacting leg-
islation addressing this issue.  Children’s mental health legislation should 
target holistic prevention by means of educator training and introducing 
emotional health curricula and early detection by implementing mental 
health screenings. 
B.  Prevention 
To effectively address the concerns about children’s mental health, 
the Washington legislature must integrate a preventative-education com-
ponent into the legislation.  This prevention component should include 
training educators on children’s mental health issues and introducing 
emotional health curriculum to students.  Public schools stand in a par-
ticularly good position to educate children on managing their emotions 
and employ preventative measures to help thwart the development of 
mental disorders.31  This section focuses on the development of preven-
tion interventions and the factors associated with creating and imple-
menting prevention programs. 
Progress in the development of prevention interventions in the field 
of mental health has faced several challenges.32  Prevention advancement 
has been slow for two reasons: insufficient knowledge of the cause of 
mental disorders and inability to alter the known causes of a particular 
disorder.33  To improve prevention interventions, researchers have devel-
oped prevention programs aimed at reducing risk factors and enhancing 
protective factors.34 
                                                            
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally JAMES MORRISON, DSM-IV MADE EASY (The Guilford Press 2001) (1995) 
(containing diagnostic criteria and explanatory material regarding all mental health disorders, includ-
ing disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools: A Shared Agenda, 
EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS IN YOUTH, Summer 2004, at 62. 
 32. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 62. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 63. 
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There are various risk factors associated with prevention programs.  
Risk factors are characteristics or hazards that, if present, make it more 
likely that a particular child, rather than another child will develop a dis-
order.35  Examples of risk factors include lack of social support, inability 
to read, difficult temperament, and exposure to bullying.36  To reduce a 
child’s chances of developing mental illness, researchers focus on de-
creasing the accumulation of risk factors.37  This strategy changes the 
risks that are most easily and quickly amenable to intervention.38  For 
example, altering a child’s classroom environment and reinforcing posi-
tive academic accomplishments—rather than altering a child’s unstable 
and dysfunctional home environment—may minimize disruptive and 
isolative behaviors.39 
Prevention programs focus not only on risk factors but also on pro-
tective factors.40  Protective factors improve an individual’s coping me-
chanism or adaptive response to an environmental hazard;41 for example, 
direct teacher instruction designed to enhance specific areas of knowl-
edge, skills, and attitudes on mental health matters or after-school youth 
development programs.42  By enhancing protective factors, researchers 
believe that individuals can learn to buffer the negative effects of risk 
factors.43 
Prevention programs that reduce risk factors and enhance protective 
factors are amenable to the school environment.  These interventions can 
be extremely helpful, are relatively uncontroversial, and are easy to im-
plement.  Accordingly, children’s mental health legislation should in-
clude a preventative component that educates teachers and school per-
sonnel about children’s mental health issues and implements emotional 
health curricula.  Student curricula should focus on themes such as anger 
management, conflict resolution skills, and relaxation techniques.  Part-
nering this preventative component with a detection component will en-
able educators to institute programs that focus on the source of childhood 
mental illness. 
                                                            
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 64. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 63. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296. 
 43. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 64. 
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C.  Detection 
Detecting a child’s mental illness is just as important as preventing 
it.44  This section discusses the process of detecting mental illness and 
includes a specific introduction to mental health screening instruments. 
Generally speaking, successful treatment of children with mental 
disorders is a result of the following process: detection of a potential 
mental health problem, comprehensive assessment and evaluation, diag-
nosis, recommendation for target intervention, and treatment.45  Re-
searchers have introduced the concept of screening—also called pre-
screening or first-level screening—as a tool for detecting potential men-
tal health problems.46  While screenings do not produce a diagnosis, they 
are used as an instrument by a variety of individuals, including pediatri-
cians, nurses, school personnel, and therapists, to identify the types of 
mental health disorders that may cause a child’s emotional or behavioral 
difficulties.47 
A mental health screening is usually a brief, culturally sensitive in-
strument designed to identify children and adolescents who may be at 
risk of impaired mental health functioning and who may therefore re-
quire immediate attention, a diagnostic assessment referral, or interven-
tion.48  The primary purpose of a screening is to recognize, using a valid, 
reliable mental health instrument, a need for further assessment of a 
child.49  The screening instrument is typically one to two pages long, rap-
idly administered, and easy to understand (i.e., no complex terminol-
ogy).50  The screening instrument usually includes questions regarding 
childhood and family background and any family history of mental 
health problems.51  The goal of mental health screenings is to enhance 
detection and, ultimately, to prevent the ultimate exacerbation of a men-
tal health problem.52 
Although mental health screenings are important for early detection 
of mental illness, these screening instruments have four major limita-
tions.   First, social constructions of mental disorders vary from culture to 
                                                            
 44. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296. 
 45. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 136–39. 
 46. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296. 
 47. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 138. 
 48. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AMONG 
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2004), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
ojjdp/204956.pdf [hereinafter SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH]. 
 49. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools and System Restructuring, 
19 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 137, 142 (1999). 
 50. See generally SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 2. 
 51. Id. at 2–12. 
 52. Id. 
262 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:255 
culture, and mental health screening instruments might not successfully 
address inherent language or cultural bias.53  Second, because the admin-
istrator of the test reviews and interprets some of the screening instru-
ments’ results, the outcome of those results may be impacted or skewed 
by potential subjectivity.54  Third, it is imperative that screening instru-
ments are age appropriate and that administrators consider the cognitive 
level of the student being tested.55  Fourth, some mental health screening 
instruments lack evidence of psychometric reliability.56 
While there are drawbacks to mental health screenings, most diag-
nostic instruments contain inherent biases.57  Relatively minor problems 
with reliability and validity, while notable, are not critical, considering 
the purpose of these instruments is to promote early detection of possible 
mental health issues, not to diagnose a child with a mental health disor-
der.  Currently, the two laws Washington has enacted regarding chil-
dren’s mental health do not require schools to use mental health screen-
ings. 
D.  The Current State of Children’s Mental Health Law in Washington 
Although Washington has yet to take any explicit steps to improve 
children’s mental health in the public school system, there have been 
some initial steps in the right direction.  This section discusses the Men-
tal Health Transformation Project and introduces two state statutes re-
garding the children’s mental health system in Washington. 
In October 2005, Washington was awarded a Mental Health Trans-
formation State Incentive Grant.58  The grant created the Washington 
Mental Health Transformation Project and called for a focus on system-
wide reform.59  The conditions of the grant require specific focus on the 
areas of planning and implementation, community organization activi-
ties, research and evaluation, and recommendations for change in service 
delivery.60 
The Mental Health Transformation Project submitted Plan Phase I 
in 2006, which included an entire chapter devoted to prevention and ear-
                                                            
 53. Id. at 9. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. Id. at 9. 
 56. Id. at 12. 
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. Washington’s Mental Health Transformation Project: Partnerships for Recovery and Resil-
iency, The Project, http://mhtransformation.wa.gov/MHTG/project.shtml (last visited July 2009). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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ly intervention.61  The plan stated that “while excellent work occurs 
in . . . education programs, issues around screening and early interven-
tion for children in public schools remains a challenge.”62  It called for a 
system of “coordinated school health” in Washington.63 
David Brenna, former Senior Policy Analyst for the Transformation 
Project, believes that mental health screening instruments could affect 
teachers’ responses to social and emotional development in the class-
room.64  Brenna recognizes that the challenge for teachers is that they are 
unfamiliar with mental health services.65  Therefore, Brenna advocates 
that Washington should engage teachers with “sets of tools to better un-
derstand children who present challenges in the learning environment.”66  
He believes that educating children and teachers about social and emo-
tional barriers to learning not only helps teachers do their job but also 
helps identify children with emotional issues.67  Thus, Brenna argues 
prevention through teacher education and social and developmental stan-
dards is a great approach to transforming Washington children’s mental 
health.68  This is the direction that the Transformation Project is now 
headed.69 
While Washington has begun to take introductory steps to address 
children’s mental health through grant incentives such as the Mental 
Health Transformation Project, it has yet to implement any legislation 
aimed to improve children’s mental health in coordination with the pub-
lic education system.  However, there are two statutes in particular worth 
mentioning. 
First, the Community Mental Health Services Act was enacted with 
the intent to establish a community mental health program that provides 
access to mental health services for both adults and children who are 
acutely mentally ill or severely emotionally disturbed.70  The statute’s 
purpose is to promote earlier identification of mentally ill children and to 
ensure that children receive treatment appropriate for their developmen-
                                                            
 61. WASHINGTON STATE’S MENTAL HEALTH TRANSFORMATION PROJECT, 2006 WASHINGTON 
MENTAL HEALTH TRANSFORMATION PLAN: PHASE I 122-30 (Sep. 30, 2006), available at 
http://mhtransformation.wa.gov/pdf/mhtg/CMHP_Ch4.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 125. 
 63. Id. at 126. 
 64. Telephone Interview with David Brenna, Senior Policy Analyst, Mental Health Transfor-
mation Project, in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.015(1) (2009). 
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tal level.71  The statute also provides for coordination of services between 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the office of the superin-
tendent of public instruction, mental hospitals, county authorities, and 
other support services, including the families of mentally ill individu-
als,72 as well as creates regional support network programs to facilitate 
the delivery of those services.73  Although the Community Mental Health 
Services Act recognizes the importance of and need for children’s mental 
health services, it does not incorporate the public education system in its 
efforts to prevent and detect childhood mental illness. 
The second statute, Coordination of Children’s Mental Health Ser-
vices, was created to implement an improved system of children’s mental 
health services in Washington.74  The statute’s goal is to promote early 
identification, intervention, and prevention; coordinate existing mental 
health programs; and integrate educational support services to address 
students’ diverse learning styles.75  Additionally, the statute recognizes 
that such a system should provide a continuum of services, equity in ac-
cess to services, and qualified mental health providers.76  However, the 
statute’s purpose—to improve the efficacy of the current system—does 
not integrate the public education system. 
In sum, to successfully curb the prevalence of mental health disor-
ders in children, legislators should afford special attention to the con-
cepts of prevention and detection.  The Washington legislature should 
incorporate not only a curriculum and educator training component into 
children’s mental health laws but also a mental health screening compo-
nent to help effectuate the detection of possible mental health problems.  
While Washington statutes do recognize the need for children’s mental 
health services and are striving to improve those existing services, there 
is no current legislation addressing the issue at hand.  As discussed in the 
next Part, the federal government recognizes the importance of public 
school involvement in children’s mental health, including early detection 
through mental health screenings. 
III.  FEDERAL CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
While schools may not be in the business of mental health, the pub-
lic education system must address children’s mental health concerns if 
schools are to serve their function of teaching students and promoting 
                                                            
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 71.24.015(6). 
 73. Id. § 71.24.016 (2009). 
 74. Id. § 71.36.005 (2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. § 71.36.025 (2009). 
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their success.77  Even though schools may not be responsible for meeting 
every need of each student, they must address those needs that directly 
affect learning.78 
This Part discusses federal initiatives and statutes that aim to im-
prove mental health systems in schools and regulate the distribution of 
school surveys—which could potentially include mental health screen-
ings.  These initiatives and statutes include: (1) the President’s New 
Freedom Commission on Mental Health, (2) the Protection of Pupil 
Rights Act and the No Child Left Behind Act, and (3) the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act.  It is especially important for Washing-
ton to consider federal laws that regulate the administration of surveys 
because these statutes dictate the requisite structure of state mental health 
schemes.  Of particular importance are the federal statutes that regulate 
parental consent because consent plays a large role in the constitutional-
ity of mental health screenings, discussed in Part IV. 
A.  The President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
The federal government supports improving the children’s mental 
health system.  In 2002, by Executive Order, President George W. Bush 
created the President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
(“the Commission”).79  The Commission was to, among other things, 
“recommend improvements that allow . . . children with serious emo-
tional disturbance to live, work, learn, and participate fully in their com-
munities.”80 
In 2003, the Commission released a critical report addressing the 
problem of fragmented health care in the United States.81  Because ac-
cess to mental health care is scattered in this country, families are often 
responsible for coordinating their own support and services.82  Naturally, 
the search for care usually occurs at a time of crisis; when the family’s 
ability to realize this responsibility is most compromised.83  While multi-
ple programs, regulated by various federal agencies are involved in the 
field of mental health, most care is managed by states and localities.84  
                                                            
 77. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 31, at 59. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Exec. Order No. 13,263, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,337 (Apr. 29, 2002). 
 80. Id. 
 81. THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE 
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2003), available at 
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/downloads/FinalReport.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION]. 
 82. Michael F. Hogan, Introduction to THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra 
note 81, at 1. 
 83. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 8. 
 84. Id. 
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Furthermore, these various programs are governed by different statutes, 
shaped by diverse congressional committees, and defended by multiple 
constituencies.85  Consequently, the political dynamics between these 
layers of government tend to frustrate comprehensive reform of the sys-
tem.86 
To implement comprehensive reform, the report recommends “fun-
damentally transforming how mental health care is delivered in the Unit-
ed States.”87  The report proposes six goals for achieving transformation, 
including (1) “Americans Understand that Mental Health is Essential to 
Overall Health;” (2) “Mental Health Care is Consumer and Family Dri-
ven;” and (3) “Early Mental Health Screening, Assessment and Referral 
to Services Are Common Practice.”88 
Most important for the purposes of this Comment is the third 
goal—”Early mental health screening[s] . . . are common practice.”89  
The third goal specifically recommends that the government improve and 
expand school mental health programs.90  The report recognizes that 
many problems associated with the current mental health system result 
from late diagnosis and lack of participation in care.91  To address this 
problem, the report recommends a stronger focus on early childhood 
mental health and endorses the aforementioned concept of preventative 
interventions.92 The report suggests that the government should re-think 
how school systems can more efficiently partner with and use state and 
federal funds to support school-based mental health services.93  Of par-
ticular importance, the report states that “[s]chools are in a key position 
to identify mental health problems early and to provide a link to appro-
priate services.”94  Thus, the Commission’s report robustly supports the 
notion that states should enact mental health legislation to include mental 
health screenings in public schools. 
B.  The Protection of Pupil Rights Act and the No Child Left Behind Act 
In addition to the New Freedom Commission, the federal govern-
ment has also enacted statutes that affect state mental health schemes.  
                                                            
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  The other three goals include (4) “Disparities in Mental Health 
Services are Eliminated;” (5) “Excellent Mental Health Care is Delivered and Research is Acceler-
ated;” and (6) “Technology is Used to Access Mental Health Care and Information.” Id. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 53. 
 94. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
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The Protection of Pupil Rights Act (PPRA) was enacted in 1974.95  The 
PPRA protects student privacy and regulates parental consent to public 
school administration of surveys and evaluations.96  In 2002, the No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) expanded the PPRA.97 
The PPRA now requires schools to allow parents to inspect surveys 
and evaluations.98  The statute dictates that no student shall be required to 
submit to a survey that reveals personal information, including “mental 
or psychological problems of the student or the student’s family.”99  The 
school must also notify parents of upcoming surveys and offer an oppor-
tunity for the parent to opt the student out of participation in a survey that 
collects personal information.100 
In sum, the PPRA requires schools to inform parents of sensitive 
surveys and allow parents to rebut assumed consent.101  Thus the statute 
models passive parental consent.  Understanding the relationship be-
tween mental health screenings and surveys in the context of the PPRA is 
important because parental consent, as discussed infra in Part IV.B, is a 
sensitive topic in diagnosing childhood mental illness.  Thus, the issue of 
importance is whether mental health screenings constitute surveys under 
the PPRA. 
The PPRA statute does not define “survey,” but it states that sur-
veys include evaluations, and it refers to “survey, analysis, or evaluation” 
several times.102  Technically speaking, screening instruments are only 
indicator tools, not evaluative tools.  Thus, the purpose of a mental health 
screening is not to assess, analyze, or evaluate but to refer children with 
potential mental health issues for evaluation.103  Nevertheless, most indi-
viduals would agree that mental health screenings could easily be classi-
fied as sensitive surveys.  To be safe, schools planning on administering 
mental health screenings should comply with the PPRA passive consent 
model. 
Although passive parental consent is the floor, the Washington leg-
islature should heighten that standard to require informed and active pa-
rental consent to mental health screenings.  Washington’s legislation 
should therefore include provisions that require public schools to provide 
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parents with advanced notice of screenings and active consent forms.  
Active parental consent not only explicitly notifies parents that students, 
with their permission, are going to be asked to divulge sensitive informa-
tion but also offers comfort to those concerned with student privacy.  
Thus, to avoid ambiguity under the PPRA, Washington should explicitly 
require informed and active parental consent as part of its children’s 
mental health legislation. 
C.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In addition to the PPRA and the NCLB, the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA), reauthorized in 2004 under the Individu-
als with Disabilities Improvement Act, includes an important implication 
for teachers, parents, and children with regard to childhood mental ill-
ness.104  An amendment to IDEA, entitled “Prohibition on Mandatory 
Medication,” bans “state and local educational personnel from requiring 
a child to obtain a prescription . . . as a condition of attending school 
[or] . . . receiving an evaluation.”105  Because teachers were concerned 
with potential communication barriers, the legislature included a provi-
sion explicitly allowing teachers to share classroom-based observations 
with parents.106  This language is particularly important because it en-
courages collaboration and transparency between parents and public 
schools vis-à-vis children’s mental health.  Mental screening legislation 
should reinforce open communication between families and education 
systems when it concerns a child’s mental well-being. 
While the President’s New Freedom Commission, the PPRA, and 
the IDEA do not explicitly address regulations regarding the distribution 
of mental health screenings in public schools, each plays an important 
role.  The federal government clearly recognizes the need for early men-
tal health screenings as evidenced by the goals of the Commission’s re-
port.  The PPRA and the NCLB regulate parental consent to sensitive 
school surveys and model passive parental consent, and the IDEA plainly 
encourages full and frank communication between teachers and parents 
regarding children’s behavioral health.  While the federal statutes address 
formalistic concerns with enacting a mental health scheme in Washing-
ton, case law, particularly Supreme Court precedent, tackles the norma-
tive concerns with mental health screening legislation, specifically in 
relation to family privacy and the fundamental right to parent. 
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IV.  THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENT 
Because Washington should adopt a transparent mental health 
scheme for public schools that implements routine in-school screenings, 
it is essential that the legislature address issues surrounding privacy and 
parental rights.  Mental health screenings concern very private and per-
sonal matters, and traditionally, children’s mental health issues have 
been kept inside the family circle.  Thus, mental health screening legisla-
tion naturally raises questions relating to privacy, constitutionality, and 
infringement of the fundamental right to parent.107 
Despite their personal and sensitive content, mental health screen-
ings are not typically conducted in private and are generally administered 
by individuals who are not family members.  As a result, public schools 
have access to personal data that is usually privy to a child’s parents and 
family members.  Do mental health screenings blur the line between pri-
vacy, the fundamental right to parent, and the best interests of the child?  
Constitutional debates regarding mental health screenings primarily arise 
out of Supreme Court holdings and other courts’ subsequent interpreta-
tions. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Fundamental Right to 
Parent 
Because mental health screenings concern information of an inti-
mately private nature, mental health legislation must acknowledge the 
nebulous line between constitutional and unconstitutional infringements 
on the fundamental right to parent.  The broader question of constitu-
tional concern in the area of mental health is whether individuals are en-
titled to have mental health problems without the government stepping in 
and doing something about it.  However, the question addressed in this 
Comment is narrower: is the fundamental right to parent infringed upon 
by the implementation of widespread mental health screenings in public 
schools?  To answer this question, it is first necessary to understand the 
constitutional foundation for the fundamental right to parent. 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution dictates that 
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”108  The Supreme Court has found that, under this 
guarantee, certain individual rights are so fundamental that the govern-
ment must justify its interference by proving that its action is necessary 
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to achieve a compelling government purpose.109  Recognized fundamen-
tal rights include: the right to marry,110 the right to procreate,111 the right 
to abortion,112 and the right to control the upbringing of one’s children.113  
While none of these rights are specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, the Court has held that liberty should be construed to include these 
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process analysis.114 
The first Supreme Court cases recognizing constitutional protection 
for family autonomy involved the rights of parents to control the up-
bringing of their children.115  In 1923, the Supreme Court, in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, declared a state law prohibiting public schools from teaching 
in any language other than English unconstitutional.116  The Court invali-
dated the law under a substantive due process analysis and held that the 
statute violated the rights of parents to make decisions regarding their 
children.117  Justice McReynolds noted, “Corresponding to the right of 
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education 
suitable to their station in life.”118 
Just two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held a 
state law requiring children to attend public schools unconstitutional.119  
The Court stated, “The child is not the mere creature of the state; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for his additional obligations.”120  
With these two cases, the Supreme Court established the fundamental 
liberty of parents and guardians to control the upbringing and education 
of their children.121 
However, the Court has also recognized parents’ right to make de-
cisions and to control the upbringing of their child is not absolute and 
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can be interfered with by the state if it is necessary to protect a child.122  
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld the application of child la-
bor laws to a nine-year-old girl who had distributed religious literature at 
the direction of her parents.123  While the Court acknowledged that there 
is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” it also 
stated that the “family itself is not beyond regulation in the public inter-
est” and that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring 
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many 
other ways.”124 
Since the initial recognition of the fundamental right to parent, the 
Supreme Court has given great deference to parents when weighing par-
ents’ and states’ competing claims on behalf of children.125  In Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had a constitutional 
right, based on their fundamental rights to parent and to freely exercise 
their religion, to excuse their children from a compulsory school atten-
dance law.126  The Court noted that under the Meyer v Nebraska doctrine, 
the compulsory school attendance law interfered with “the liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children un-
der their control.”127 
The Court has also granted substantial deference to parents in the 
context of children’s mental health.128  In Parham v. J.R., the Court was 
presented with the issue of what type of due process must be provided to 
children when their parents commit them to a mental institution.129  The 
Court stated that before a child can be institutionalized by a parent, the 
child must be screened by either a doctor or other neutral fact-finder.130  
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that while the fact 
“[t]hat some parents ‘may at times be acting against the interest of their 
children’ . . . creates a basis for caution,” “[t]he statist notion that gov-
ernmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because 
some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradi-
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tion.”131  Both Parham and Yoder reflect the extent of the Court’s eager-
ness to defer to parental decision-making.132 
While the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed and recognized 
that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising and controlling 
the upbringing of their children,133 it has also acknowledged that in cer-
tain situations, such as protecting children from economic exploitation, a 
parent’s interest yields to the state’s interest in protecting the child.134  
Because the Court has not established a bright-line rule for determining 
when a state has impermissibly intruded on the fundamental right to par-
ent, the Court’s involvement in parental rights cases has increased in the 
wake of recent controversies including mandatory contraception distribu-
tion programs,135 sex education classes in public schools,136 and compre-
hensive mental health screening programs.137 
B.  Other Courts’ Interpretations of the Fundamental Right to Parent 
Because the Supreme Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for 
ascertaining when a state has impermissibly intruded on the fundamental 
right to parent, this section explores the approaches that other courts have 
taken with respect to state public school action, such as distribution of 
school surveys.  These cases help determine whether mental health 
screenings in public schools violate the constitutional right to parent. 
Circuit courts strictly construe actionable violations of the familial 
privacy right to include only those instances where a state official’s ac-
tion is aimed directly at the parent-child relationship.138  For example, in 
Gruenke v. Seip, the Third Circuit held that a school precluding parents 
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from making vital decisions concerning their children violated the par-
ents’ constitutional right to parent.139 
When a school coach forced a student to take a pregnancy test, the 
girl’s parents filed suit against the coach for violating their constitutional 
right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their child.140  Be-
cause the situation was forced and entirely concentrated on an intensely 
personal issue, the Third Circuit found that this case “pre-
sent[ed] . . . another example of the arrogation of the parental role by a 
school.”141  Notably, the court stated that “[s]chool-sponsored counseling 
and psychological testing that pry into private family activities can over-
step the boundaries of school authority and impermissibly usurp the fun-
damental right of parents to bring up their children, as they are guaran-
teed by the Constitution.”142  Thus, the court articulated a distinction be-
tween those school actions that are directly aimed at parental decision-
making authority and those that simply affect the making of parental de-
cisions.143  This distinction will be important to take into consideration 
when weighing whether public schools, specifically Washington public 
schools, should implement mental health screening programs. 
Other courts have been willing to uphold school action as constitu-
tional if information was gathered from students on a voluntary basis and 
for a community purpose.144  In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, 
the district court considered the constitutionality of a questionnaire ad-
ministered to middle and high school students that posed highly personal 
questions, the results of which were to be collectively used to develop 
community programs.145  Before the questionnaire was administered, 
parents were notified about the nature of the survey and were given an 
opportunity to assess the questionnaire.146  Nevertheless, parents brought 
suit against the school, claiming that the survey was not anonymous and 
was involuntarily administered.147  The court rejected these arguments 
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and suggested that the parents should have inferred from the school mail-
ings that the nature of the questionnaire was personal and that failure to 
respond constituted implicit consent.148  And while the court agreed that 
it was reasonable to infer that the survey was involuntary, it held that a 
“voluntary, anonymous survey with notice of opt-out possibilities to par-
ents” does not constitute an intrusion into the constitutionally-protected 
fundamental right to parent without governmental interference.149 
Thus, in C.N., the notice and opt-out provisions were instrumental 
in finding the school action constitutional.150  This case provides a par-
ticularly usefully analysis regarding school surveys that collect sensitive 
personal information, which will be utilized in Part VI to determine the 
type of mental health screening Washington should enact. 
In Fields v. Palmdale School District, the Ninth Circuit also ad-
dressed the issue of controversial school surveys.151  In that case, parents 
had given permission for their elementary school students to take part in 
a district survey regarding psychological barriers to learning.152  After the 
survey was distributed, parents learned that several of the survey ques-
tions were related to sexual topics.153  Parental-rights proponents claimed 
that the explicit nature of the questions violated their fundamental right 
to introduce their children to sexual matters as they see fit—without in-
terference from the state.154  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the case, holding that a parent’s right to control a 
child’s education does not encompass the right to control the flow of in-
formation in public schools.155  The court stated that the survey questions 
were allowed because they were rationally related to the school board’s 
legitimate interest in the effective education and mental welfare of its 
students.156 
While parents legally remain the sole decision-makers for their 
children, the fundamental right to parent is neither absolute nor unquali-
fied.  Although the Third Circuit held, in Gruenke, that school action 
aimed directly at the parent-child relationship was unconstitutional, cases 
like Ridgewood and Fields exemplify the judicial trend of shifting paren-
tal authority over to schools.  This trend is most applicable when the 
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school provides notice, makes participation voluntary, and has a legiti-
mate interest, such as protecting students’ mental welfare.  Because the 
Supreme Court has not provided a bright-line rule as to when school ac-
tions infringe upon the fundamental right to parent, these factors are im-
portant to consider in light of states’ diverse approaches to children’s 
mental health legislation. 
V.  STATE APPROACHES TO CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 
As the Washington legislature considers legislation requiring men-
tal health screenings in public schools, it is important to review similar 
legislation adopted by other states.  Illinois has adopted a broad approach 
that emphasizes comprehensive children’s mental health reform and 
widespread mental screenings.157  Utah has adopted a narrow approach 
which emphasizes privacy and limitations on parent–teacher communica-
tion.158  Connecticut has adopted a more moderate approach that empha-
sizes cooperative and transparent school mental health programs.159  This 
Part describes these three approaches in consideration of what children’s 
mental health legislation Washington should enact. 
A.  Illinois: The Broad Approach 
Of the three state approaches described, Illinois has the most com-
prehensive children’s mental health legislation.  Illinois implemented the 
Children’s Mental Health Act in 2003.  This statute provides comprehen-
sive and wide-ranging goals for Illinois’s Children’s Mental Health Plan, 
including 
(2) Guidelines for incorporating social and emotional development 
into school learning standards and educational programs . . .; (4) 
Recommendations regarding a State budget for children’s mental 
health prevention, early intervention, and treatment across all State 
agencies . . .; (8) Recommendations for a comprehensive, multi-
faceted public awareness campaign to reduce the stigma of mental 
illness and educate families . . . about the benefits of chil-
dren’s . . . development . . .; [and] (9) Recommendations for creat-
ing a quality-driven children’s mental health system . . . that con-
ducts ongoing needs assessments . . . .160 
In regards to the relationship between mental health and the public 
school system, the Illinois statute states that 
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(a) The Illinois State Board of Education shall develop and imple-
ment a plan to incorporate social and emotional development stan-
dards as part of the Illinois Learning Standards . . . [and] (b) Every 
Illinois school district shall develop a policy for incorporating social 
and emotional development into the district’s educational pro-
gram . . . [that] shall address teaching and assessing social and emo-
tional skills and protocols for responding to children with social, 
emotional, or mental health problems . . . that impact learning abil-
ity.161 
There are three key parts to this statute.  First, it requires the state of 
Illinois to develop a multi-faceted, strategic system to address prevention 
and early intervention of children’s mental illness.162  Second, it directs 
the Illinois Board of Education to incorporate social and emotional de-
velopment standards into state learning standards.163  Finally, it addresses 
the assessment of children’s social, emotional, and mental health prob-
lems.164  Read altogether, the Illinois statute suggests that Illinois school 
districts must develop an all-encompassing mental health program for its 
students; one that not only implements curriculum standards but also en-
courages proactive identification of students with social and emotional 
problems.165  Thus, the statute calls for the implementation of mental 
health screenings in all public schools.166 
In addition to recognizing the need for mental health screening pro-
grams, there are three other positive aspects of the statute: (1) it focuses 
on the best interests of the child; (2) it emphasizes destigmatization; and 
(3) it recognizes a school’s unique position in identifying children’s men-
tal health issues. 
First, while the statute affords schools, and therefore the state, con-
siderable authority, it also offers comprehensive, unreserved attention to 
the best interests of the child.  For example, the statute “recom-
mend[s] . . . [that] key State agencies and programs conduct ongoing 
needs assessments,”167 and it directs the Illinois Board of Education to 
“develop a policy . . . [that] address[es] . . . social and emotional skills 
and protocols for responding to children with social, emotional, or men-
tal health problems.”168  These clauses ordain the state with considerable 
power, which may infringe upon the fundamental right to parent.  The 
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thrust of the statute, however, spotlights the overall healthy social and 
emotional development of children and underscores the public benefit of 
doing so.  Accordingly, the statute strives to “develop a Children’s Men-
tal Health Plan containing short-term and long-term recommendations to 
provide comprehensive, coordinated mental health prevention, early in-
tervention, and treatment services for children from birth through age 
18.”169  It also recommends a “comprehensive, multi-faceted public 
awareness campaign.”170  This enthusiastic attitude toward active preven-
tion and detection of mental illness gets to the heart of the issue and pro-
vides a more progressive approach than other states.171 
Second, the Illinois statute explicitly requires a “campaign to re-
duce the stigma of mental illness.”172  As mentioned supra in Part III.A, 
one of the main goals of the President’s New Freedom Commission is to 
implement marketing campaigns that focus on destigmatization.  Illi-
nois’s statutory mandate for a campaign to reduce the stigma of mental 
illness encourages active dialogue regarding children’s mental health and 
is consistent with the goals of federal legislation.173 
Third, the Illinois statute recognizes that schools are in a key posi-
tion to identify mental health problems early and to provide appropriate 
services or links to services.  The statute incorporates guidelines into 
school learning standards, implores school districts to “develop a policy 
for incorporating social and emotional development into the district’s 
educational program,” and addresses protocols for responding to children 
with mental health problems.174  By realizing that educators stand in a 
unique position—both as experts in children’s behavior and as individu-
als who spend large amounts of time with students, the statute compels 
teachers to play a key role in detecting mental illness.175 
The Illinois statute’s three strong emphases—the best interests of 
the child, destigmatization of mental illness, and involvement of the edu-
cation community in the detection of mental illness—could potentially 
serve as the building blocks for Washington’s children’s mental health 
legislation.  There are, however, two worrisome aspects of the Illinois 
statute.  First, the statute favors school authority and, consequently, sub-
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stantial state power.176  And second, the statute does not address whether 
this legislation mandates mental health screenings for all children in the 
public school system, regardless of parental consent;177 there are no no-
tice, consent, or opt-out provisions in the statute.178  Because the statute 
favors state involvement in children’s mental illness and is unclear on the 
parental consent process, this statute might face serious constitutional 
challenges. 
In considering whether the Illinois statute infringes on the funda-
mental right to parent, courts will likely examine the validity of the 
state’s interest in guarding the general well-being of children.179  While 
protecting children’s mental health is of great importance, there is no 
case law on point.180  As a result, it is unclear how the court would rule 
on this issue.  However, in comparison to the C.N. case, where the court 
held that a school survey was constitutional because there was parental 
notice and an opt-out provision, the Illinois statute’s ambiguousness 
might weigh against constitutionality.  Thus, in drafting Washington’s 
mental health legislation, care should be taken to avoid ambiguity re-
garding parental notice and consent provisions. 
B.  Utah: The Narrow Approach 
Utah takes a much narrower approach than Illinois.  Utah does not 
have a specific statute like Illinois, but in 2007, Utah enacted the Medi-
cation Recommendations for Children Act, which pertains specifically to 
children’s mental health.181  The Utah statute places specific restrictions 
on school personnel, which is defined to include all school district em-
ployees.182  Section two of the statute states that school personnel may 
provide information and observations to a student’s parent or guard-
ian about that student, including observations and concerns in the 
following areas: . . . (ii) health and wellness; (iii) social interactions; 
[and] (iv) behavior . . . [and] refer students to other appropriate 
school personnel . . . including referrals and communication with a 
school counselor or other mental health professionals working with-
in the school system.183 
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Section four, however, explicitly addresses the actions that school 
personnel may not take.  Specifically, school personnel may not 
(a) recommend . . . that a child take . . . a psychotropic medication; 
(b) require that a student take . . . a psychotropic medication as a 
condition for attending school; (c) recommend that a parent . . . seek 
or use a type of psychiatric or psychological treatment for a child; 
[or] (d) conduct a psychiatric or behavioral health evaluation or 
mental health screening, test, evaluation, or assessment of a 
child.184 
The statute then states that a school counselor or other mental health pro-
fessional may “(a) recommend, but not require, a psychiatric or behav-
ioral health evaluation of a child; (b) recommend, but not require, psy-
chiatric, psychological, or behavioral treatment for a child; [and] (c) con-
duct a psychiatric or behavioral health evaluation or mental health 
screening, test, evaluation, or assessment of a child.”185 
The Utah statutory language opposes mental health screenings.  The 
law places severe communication restrictions on teachers and school 
administrators.  For example, although teachers may discuss observations 
regarding health, social wellness, and behavior with parents,186 they may 
not recommend psychotropic medication187 or recommend that a parent 
seek psychological treatment for a child.188  Each teacher, however, re-
tains the right to communicate with a school counselor or mental health 
professional, who may then recommend, but not require, a behavioral 
health evaluation189 or conduct a mental health screening.190  Thus, the 
most restrictive aspect of the statute is its attempt to place clear bounda-
ries on parent–teacher communication regarding a student’s mental 
health. 
Specifically, the Utah statute places a strong emphasis on (1) family 
privacy, (2) the social construction of emotional health, and (3) destig-
matization.  First, Utah’s Medication Recommendations for Children Act 
favors generous parental rights and family autonomy.  While the statute 
does not ban mental health screenings, it significantly curtails liberal im-
plementation of the tool.  Thus, by logical inference, the Utah statute re-
cognizes parents’ countervailing interest against the state’s interest in 
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making private and personal determinations on how much information 
the family would like to share with a school.191 
Second, because the Utah statute skirts away from parent–teacher 
communication regarding mental health and psychotropic medications, 
there may be some hesitation regarding the social construction of emo-
tional health.  Unlike the stable and universally accepted standards for 
routine in-school vision, hearing, or physical health examinations, stan-
dards for what constitute emotional health are ever-changing and of con-
siderable debate.192  For example, the most dramatic example of what 
constitutes “good emotional health” concerns the construction of homo-
sexuality.193  While 30 years ago, the American Psychiatric Association 
included homosexuality as a category of mental illness, the Association 
no longer views homosexuality as a pathology.194  Moreover, it is likely 
that there are contemporary notions of emotional disturbance held by the 
majority that, in the eyes of some parents, are well within the continuum 
of emotional health.195  Because Utah’s statute deemphasizes active dia-
logue regarding children’s mental health, perhaps it has chosen to sup-
port parents’ rights to subscribe to a definition of mental health that best 
suits their cultural and religious conceptions of emotional well-being.196 
Third, the Utah statute reflects concern with stigmatization.  Be-
cause the statute places such strict limitations on parent–teacher commu-
nication and on psychological assessments of students, the state is likely 
concerned with the unnecessary stigmatization of children.  Children are 
an inherently vulnerable population, and mental health is undoubtedly a 
highly personal topic.197  The stigma attached to the possibility, or even 
the mere intimation, of mental illness may be reason enough for parents 
to prefer to deal with their child’s emotional health without school in-
volvement.198  The statutory language could reflect the state legislature’s 
belief that children’s mental health is a subject better left to the family or, 
perhaps, to an intimate and private conversation between parents and 
their child’s pediatrician. 
Although the Utah statute emphasizes three important aspects of 
children’s mental health, there is one grave concern with this legislative 
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approach: such a narrow approach restricts the school’s ability to com-
municate with parents about mental health concerns and therefore may 
not be in the best interests of the child.199  Because open discussions be-
tween parents and teachers regarding a child’s behavior might help per-
suade a parent that psychological testing is needed, restriction on such 
dialogue may further exacerbate the condition.200  The restrictive Utah 
law has the potential to create “silent witnesses,” which does not help the 
child, the parent, or the state.201  Moreover, restricted communication 
may serve to propagate further denial of a child’s mental health prob-
lems, and concerns with stigmatization should not remain a barrier to 
seeking care. 
It is unclear whether the restrictions that Utah places on open and 
frank discussions between parents and teachers conflicts with the IDEA 
provision, which explicitly allows teachers to raise concerns about men-
tal health issues with parents.  While the Utah Code prohibits teachers 
from discussing psychological treatment or psychotropic medication with 
parents, the federal statute expressly encourages teachers to share with 
parents classroom observations or the need for special education and re-
lated services.  Although further discussion of this topic is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, the statute’s mixed messages and uncertainties 
likely create confusion for Utah educators.202 
Because Washington should adopt a mental health scheme for pub-
lic schools consistent with the notion of parental rights while also pro-
tecting the well-being of mentally ill children, state legislation should 
incorporate only certain features of the Utah statute; specifically, a defi-
nition of mental health that reflects cultural sensitivity and preservation 
of parental rights through notice and active consent. 
C.  Connecticut: The Moderate Approach 
Unlike Illinois’s broad approach or Utah’s narrow approach, Con-
necticut takes a more moderate position.  The Connecticut statute per-
taining to children’s mental health focuses on the duties of the Education 
Department.203  The duties of the Department are as follows: “(1) [to] 
[c]oordinate school-based early detection and prevention programs . . ., 
and (2) in conjunction with the Department of Children and Families and 
local mental health agencies, [to] provide training [and] consultation . . . 
to . . . boards of education in early detection, intervention techniques, 
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screening . . . and evaluation.”204  The statute also states that the Depart-
ment “shall identify specific goals and objectives for the program prior to 
the solicitation of applications for participation in such program and shall 
define in advance what specific measures it shall employ to measure the 
attainment of the goals and objectives.”205 
The Connecticut statute creates a school-based early detection and 
prevention program under the specific pretext of cooperation with the 
Department of Children and Families.206  The statute emphasizes educa-
tor training on early detection techniques, including mental health 
screenings.207  Because the statute requires each school to identify spe-
cific goals and objectives for these programs and to define what meas-
ures it shall employ, each public school is held accountable not only for a 
thorough review of the purposes for the children’s mental health program 
but also for an assessment of the best screening instruments for imple-
menting the primary mental health program.208 
The Connecticut statute has four key characteristics: (1) coopera-
tion, (2) training and utilization of educators, (3) a more transparent as-
sessment process focused on accountability, and (4) early detection. 
First, because the Connecticut statute explicitly requires that the 
Department of Education implement school mental health “detection and 
prevention programs . . . in conjunction with the Department of Children 
and Families [sic] and local mental health agencies,”209 the Connecticut 
legislature has chosen to emphasize cooperation and utilize existing chil-
dren’s mental health expertise.  Naturally, the Department of Children 
and Families and local mental health agencies are in a better position 
than the Department of Education to recognize the newest, most effec-
tive, and culturally appropriate assessment instruments.210  This coopera-
tion between agencies lends itself to more thorough, efficient, and proper 
mental health assessment programs.211 
Second, like the Illinois statute, the Connecticut statute recognizes 
the concept of educators as experts, but it takes this idea one step further 
by providing unequivocal language requiring training, consultation, and 
assistance212 to educators to help develop and implement successful pro-
grams.  Because educators stand in a key position for identifying child-
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hood mental illness, this statutorily mandated support will likely lead to 
an increase in the detection of students’ mental health issues.213 
Third, the Connecticut statute incorporates a natural accountability 
mechanism.  The Connecticut law requires the Department of Education 
to identify specific goals and objectives as part of a school’s application 
for participation in the primary mental health program.214  Thus, each 
school is held accountable not only for thoroughly contemplating the 
curriculum of its program but also for assessing the measures it will em-
ploy to ensure a successful program.215  Essentially, each school will 
likely strive to identify the most appropriate screening instruments to 
guarantee an effective program, which, in turn, will ensure its continued 
participation in the primary mental health program.  This accountability 
serves to enhance the transparency of the assessment process for educa-
tors and parents alike.  Lastly, the benefits of focusing on early detection, 
as discussed above, further support the inherent value of Connecticut’s 
moderate approach.216 
Fourth, the Connecticut approach favors a cooperative and trans-
parent mental health scheme for public schools.  Although the statute 
lacks language touching upon parental rights and a specific structure for 
schools’ primary mental health programs, the Connecticut approach still 
offers a number of admirable qualities such as educator training, school 
accountability, and a focus on early detection.  Thus, the Connecticut 
statute provides a strong basic framework for Washington. 
Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut have enacted children’s mental 
health statutes across the spectrum, ranging from supportive of school 
authority to emphasis on family privacy.  The Illinois statute illustrates 
the importance of in-school screenings, educator training, and emotional 
health curriculum.  Utah’s approach demonstrates how legislation can be 
respectful of family privacy and sensitive to the meaning of mental 
health across cultures.  Finally, the Connecticut statute illustrates the im-
portance of a cooperative and transparent approach and emphasizes ac-
countability and early detection.  Washington should enact children’s 
mental health legislation that reflects an integration of these three posi-
tions. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATION FOR WASHINGTON 
In light of the positive and negative characteristics of the Illinois, 
Utah, and Connecticut statutes, Washington should adopt a modified ver-
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sion of the moderate approach.  Washington should enact a cooperative 
and transparent mental health scheme for public schools that includes in-
school screenings, informed and active parental consent, educator train-
ing, and emotional health curriculum.  This Part recommends specific 
actions that the Washington legislature should take to enact this coopera-
tive and transparent mental health scheme. 
To capture the most benefits of the state approaches mentioned 
above and to adequately address the concerns, Washington should im-
plement legislation that revolves around four themes: (1) a commitment 
to preserving open parent–teacher communication and dispelling stigma; 
(2) an informed and active parental consent process combined with an-
nual mental health screenings; (3) a cooperative framework with empha-
sis on utilizing mental health experts, training educators, and integrating 
social and development curriculum into the school system; and (4) a de-
dication to the overarching goal of furthering the best interests of each 
and every child. 
First, as opposed to the restrictions placed on teacher–parent com-
munication in the Utah statute, Washington should embrace an open door 
policy that encourages communication between all involved parties.  
Simply put, perpetuating the secrecy and stigma associated with mental 
illness does not aid in the diagnosis or treatment of children with mental 
health issues.  Both the IDEA217 and the New Freedom Commission218 
support destigmatizing mental illness in the United States.  While teach-
ers should respect family privacy, especially considering the sensitive 
nature of mental health, they should also feel free to work together with 
parents to help address the issues at hand and to improve students’ emo-
tional health.  Open communication between students, parents, teachers, 
administrators, and mental health professionals is essential to ameliorat-
ing the U.S.’s children’s mental health crisis. 
Second, the Washington legislature should incorporate an informed 
and active parental consent process and implement annual mental health 
screenings.  Perhaps the greatest concern with the public school system 
administering mental health screenings is the infringement on the fun-
damental right to parent.  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has 
not provided a bright-line rule as to when constitutional school action 
ends and infringement on the fundamental right to parent begins.219  
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However, as evidenced by district and circuit court decisions, the most 
important factors to consider in deciding whether the screening is consti-
tutional are the nature of the administration of the survey, the notice, 
consent, or opt-out procedures, and the effect of the survey on the par-
ent–child relationship.220  Because mental health screenings are impor-
tant, resourceful, and evidence-based early detection tools, Washington 
must find a way to balance these interests.  Washington should encour-
age public schools to provide voluntary annual mental health screenings 
to children, predicated on obtaining explicit, informed, and active con-
sent.  Although informed and active consent is more cumbersome than an 
opt-out procedure, this safety measure ensures that mental health screen-
ings distributed by schools will not infringe on the fundamental right to 
parent. 
Third, Washington should implement legislation that adopts a co-
operative framework that utilizes mental health expertise, trains educa-
tors, and integrates social and development standards into school curric-
ula.  Crafted after the Connecticut statute, which stressed educator train-
ing, school accountability, and cooperation,221 such an approach would 
boost the comprehensiveness of detection, teacher knowledge, and 
school accountability.  Moreover, by employing local mental health ex-
perts to develop and implement the screenings and mental health pro-
grams, those concerned with the validity of the instruments or lack of 
cultural sensitivity may be put more at ease. 
Finally, the intent of the Washington statute should stress the state’s 
dedication to furthering the best interests of the child.  The Illinois stat-
ute, in particular, did an excellent job conveying this concept by under-
scoring the benefits of ensuring the healthy social and emotional devel-
opment of children.222  In deciding the most beneficial children’s mental 
health scheme for Washington, the balance between protecting parental 
rights and granting schools the authority to help detect mental illness 
must always be viewed in light of the best interests of the child. 
In sum, Washington should adopt a cooperative and transparent 
mental health scheme for public schools that includes in-school screen-
ing, informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emo-
tional health curriculum.  Such legislation should focus on preserving 
parent–teacher communication, fostering an explicit parental consent 
process, involving the mental health community, and spotlighting the 
best interests of the child.  This approach is consonant with the notion of 
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parental rights, while protecting the well-being of Washington’s mentally 
ill children. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Because it is estimated that ten percent of children in the United 
States suffer from some form of mental illness223 and because this nation 
has experienced tragedies such as Columbine, Virginia Tech, and North-
ern Illinois University (which were later attributed to undetected mental 
illness),224 children’s mental health is an issue of great importance. 
Although federal legislation does not specifically require public 
schools to administer mental health screening instruments, it advocates 
for early detection, parental consent, and open communication.  More-
over, while Supreme Court jurisprudence does not consider the funda-
mental right to parent an absolute or qualified right, subsequent lower 
court decisions provide some clarity by reciting factors that might affect 
the constitutionality of mental health screenings.225 
States have taken drastically different approaches to children’s 
mental health legislation.  Whereas Illinois embraces a broad focus on 
comprehensive children’s mental health law reform, Utah applies a nar-
rower approach that limits parent–teacher communication regarding stu-
dents’ mental health.  Connecticut, on the other hand, adopts more mod-
erate legislation tailored toward cooperative and transparent mental 
health programs in public schools. 
Taking into consideration the various elements of these state stat-
utes, the Washington legislature should enact children’s mental health 
legislation that encourages open parent–teacher communication, requires 
explicit notice and active parental consent for in-school mental health 
screenings, fosters cooperation with the mental health community, and 
focuses on the best interests of the child.  Hopefully, Washington will 
choose to participate in the national dialogue on children’s mental health 
and will aspire to enact thoughtful and comprehensive mental health leg-
islation specifically aimed at utilizing its public education system. 
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